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I. INTRODUCTION
Nowhere in the justice system is a witness granted such responsibility
and respect as the expert1—the only witness not limited to first-hand
knowledge, but allowed to proffer opinions about why and how an event
occurred.2 In response to the growing importance of experts, a great deal of
jurisprudence developed over the past century regarding the admission of
expert testimony, though initially it developed slowly.3 The debate around
the admissibility of expert testimony truly picked up steam when
scientifically complex civil litigation started to boom.4 This led to a
nationwide sea change concerning the admission of expert testimony—
eventually referred to as the Daubert5 revolution.6
Although civil litigation underwent a tectonic shift following the
adoption of Daubert,7 the roles and responsibilities of the forensic expert did
not change.8 In criminal cases, forensic experts offer jurors a wealth of
information for understanding the crime, often serving as the lynchpin of a
criminal case, relaying to jurors the importance of specific characteristics
that link evidence to a particular person or object.9 This includes examining
patterns (e.g., fingerprint, toolmark, or bloodstain patterns), analyzing
certain substances (e.g., DNA, chemicals—especially drugs, or body fluids),
or interpreting digital evidence.10 No matter the forensic discipline,
1

See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Importance of Daubert in Frye Jurisdictions, 42
CRIM. L. BULL. 215 (2006) (“[T]he primary rationale for the Frye test is the policy concern
that lay jurors will ascribe inflated importance to expert testimony.”).
2
See Dave G. Owen, A Decade of Daubert, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 345, 346 (2002) (“[T]he
law of evidence gives experts especially wide latitude to offer opinions not available to
ordinary witnesses.”); see also FED. R. EVID. 701, 702, 703, 705 and similar state evidentiary
rules.
3
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 88–92 (2009), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12589.html
(outlining the historical development of law concerning the admission of expert testimony).
4
See Arvin Maskin & Isabella C. Lacayo, Expert Evidence In The Federal Courts: A
Historical Perspective, 20 WESTLAW J. CLASS ACTION 18, 1 (2013) (“modern admissibility
rules were largely shaped in the context of mass-tort case”).
5
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
6
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 88–90 (detailing the deficiencies of
the standard outlined under Frye v. United States, the case history of Daubert, and the policy
justifications for replacing Frye with Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 702).
7
See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 236–37 (2005) (calling the
replacement of Frye by Daubert a “profound improvement” in “civil, as opposed to criminal”
litigation).
8
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 4 (expanding on the continuity in
forensic science over the decades).
9
See Jessica G. Cino, An Uncivil Action: Criminalizing Daubert in Procedure and
Practice to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 651, 654 (2016) (finding
“uniqueness” to be the key notion upon which forensic science is grounded).
10
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 25.

EPPSTODOROW (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

8/8/2018 2:03 PM

REFRYED FORENSICS

1163

however, the forensic expert has two essential duties: (1) providing a
scientific basis for identifying persons who commit crime; and (2)
“protecting innocent persons from being convicted of crimes that they did
not commit.”11 In fulfilling these critical duties, the word of the expert is
often determinative.12 Forensic experts provide invaluable testimony both
for the prosecution of the guilty and for the exoneration of the innocent.13
Too often, however, the admission of forensic evidence is a system of high
stakes and tragic shortcomings.14 Very infrequently, the system fails
completely as a result of outright fraud.15 More often, when it falls short, it
does so due to a reliance on flawed,16 unverified,17 erroneous,18 or
subsequently discredited evidence.19 In these circumstances, the cost of
failure may be the accused’s liberty. Quis custodiet ipsos custodies?
Translated: Who, then, watches the experts?
In both theory and practice, the answer should be the court. As stated,
however, in the landmark 2009 report by the National Research Council
(NRC), “[i]n a number of forensic science disciplines, forensic science
professionals have yet to establish either the validity of their approach or the
accuracy of their conclusions, and the courts have been utterly ineffective in
addressing this problem.”20 That gulf, between evidence and empirical
validity—a gap which is shrinking, but remains too large nonetheless—has

11

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 96.
See Imwinkelried, supra note 1 (finding the primary rationale for the Frye test to be
the policy rationale that jurors will “ascribe inflated importance to expert testimony”); see
also Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for
Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 789 (1994) (“[M]ost commentators believe
ostensibly scientific testimony may sway a jury even when as science it is palpably wrong.
Science can be greatly distorted by the pressures of litigation, but once admitted into evidence,
it has an imprimatur of legitimacy and validity, and cross-examination often will not expose
its flaws.”).
13
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 4 (“For decades, the forensic science
disciplines have produced valuable evidence that has contributed to the successful prosecution
and conviction of criminals as well as to the exoneration of innocent people.”).
14
See id. at 44–46 (summarizing errors and their consequences).
15
See id. at 44 (describing the infamous fraud perpetrated by West Virginia State Police
laboratory employee Fred Zain, in which more than 100 convictions were called into question
because of Zain’s repeated falsification of lab results).
16
See id. at 178 (“Scientific studies support some aspects of bloodstain pattern
analysis. . . . but some experts extrapolate far beyond what can be supported.”).
17
See id. at 173 (“Despite the paucity of research, some arson investigators continue to
make determinations about whether or not a particular fire was set.”).
18
See id. at 176 (“. . . research is warranted in order to identify the circumstances within
which the methods of forensic odontology can provide probative value.”).
19
See Ege v. Yukins, 485 F.3d 364, 377376 (6th Cir. 2007) (granting the appellant’s
habeas corpus petition in part because the bite mark expert’s testimony was “significantly, if
not completely, discredited”).
20
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 53.
12
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led all fifty states to offer some form of post-conviction DNA testing for
exonerating the wrongfully convicted.21 This reflects a clear consensus that
extending procedural relief to those whose convictions were the result of
flawed science is important. Yet, in order to honor the spirit of this
consensus and hew more closely to the underlying goals of forensic science,
namely identifying the guilty and exonerating the innocent,22 courts must
take a more proactive approach to preventing the admission of flawed
science.
Frye23 created the first common standard for screening scientific
testimony.24 Centered around “general acceptance,” the Frye standard made
the scientific community the barrier between expert testimony and the ears
of the jurors.25 To be admissible, novel scientific techniques needed first to
gain acceptance among members of the relevant scientific community.26
Daubert, building on Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 702, shifted this
gatekeeping role from the scientific community to the bench.27 The Daubert
standard, centered around relevance and grounded in the notion that the
adversarial system would protect jurors from flawed science,28 made the
judge an arbiter of a five-part test designed, inter alia, to allow greater
flexibility.29
Although Daubert represented a watershed,30 the Frye test remains a
critical consideration in evaluating expert testimony for a host of reasons.31
First, Daubert’s profound influence has been largely limited to civil cases.32
21
DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF HANDBOOK §
1:8, at 18 (2015–16 ed.).
22
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 96.
23
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
24
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 88 (calling Frye the “first notable
development” in the development of tests governing the admissibility of scientific evidence).
25
See Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (requiring that “the thing from which the deduction is made”
to have sufficient acceptance in order to be admitted as expert testimony).
26
Id.
27
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596–97 (1993) (detailing both
the supremacy of Rule 702 and recognizing “a gatekeeping role for the judge”).
28
See id. at 596 (anticipating “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof” as the means by which to mitigate
the impact of scientifically unsound evidence).
29
See id. at 591 (requiring: (1) reliable methods and principles; (2) reliable application
of a technique to a particular case; (3) that the expert testimony fit the facts of the case; (4)
that the expert be qualified; and (5) general acceptance); see also id. at 594 (“The inquiry
envisioned by Rule 702, we emphasize, is a flexible one.”).
30
STEIN, supra note 7, at 237.
31
Adina Schwartz, A “Dogma of Empiricism” Revisited: Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and the Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v. United
States, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 193 n.157 (1997) (citing Frye’s deference to scientists as
a “fundamental philosophical insight”).
32
STEIN, supra note 7, at 237 (“[T]he replacement of Frye by the Daubert Trilogy
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On both the trial33 and appellate levels34 of the criminal justice system,
Daubert challenges to prosecutorial evidence often go unheeded. Secondly,
because states bring more than 200 times the number of criminal
prosecutions as the federal government,35 and the largest and most litigious
jurisdictions retain a version of Frye in criminal prosecutions,36 the impact
of Frye remains significant.
More than forty percent of the U.S. population lives in a Frye
jurisdiction.37 As such, Frye warrants continued attention. A quarter century
after Daubert sought to shift the “gatekeeper” role from the scientific
community to the bench and restructure admission around relevance, the
changes have not produced the intended improvement of verifiable scientific
accuracy during criminal trials.38 Instead, that hoped-for shift may have in
fact ossified existing bad habits.39 Although existent Frye tests could be
improved by modification,40 its underlying standard—general acceptance—
helps to minimize the introduction of flawed scientific evidence by filtering
evidentiary decisions through the scientific community, and consequently,
through Frye’s inherently more “austere” legal standard.41

introduced a profound improvement into the civil, as opposed to criminal justice systems
across the United States.”).
33
See Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some
Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S107, S109 (“[D]espite the frequency with
which scientific and expert testimony is proffered in criminal cases, there is a dearth of
Daubert challenges and hearings.”).
34
DAVID L FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1.35, 105 (stating that studies suggest the courts “employ Daubert more
lackadaisically in criminal trials—especially in regard to prosecution evidence—than in civil
cases—especially in regard to plaintiff evidence”).
35
Neufeld, supra note 33.
36
Edward J. Imwinkelried & William A. Tobin, Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis
(CBLA) Evidence: Valid Inference or Ipse Dixit?, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 43, 55 (2003)
[hereinafter Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis].
37
United States Census 2010, CENSUS, https://www.census.gov/2010census/ (combining
population totals for California, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Washington, and Washington D.C.).
38
STEIN, supra note 7, at 237.
39
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 110. “The judicial system is
encumbered by, among other things, judges and lawyers who generally lack the scientific
expertise necessary to comprehend and evaluate forensic evidence in an informed manner,
trial judges (sitting alone) who must decide evidentiary issues without the benefit of judicial
colleagues and often with little time for extensive research and reflection, and the highly
deferential nature of the appellate review afforded trial courts’ Daubert rulings.” NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 110.
40
Schwartz, supra note 31, 198–99 (advocating for a return to Frye, but stating that the
case law surrounding general acceptance “requires modification”).
41
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 509 U.S. 579, 587–89 (describing the
standard of relevance under Rule 702 as “liberal,” whereas the Frye general acceptance test
is termed “austere”).
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In five parts, this paper will argue for broader application of the Frye
standard during criminal trials. Part II will provide a general overview of
forensic science. Part III will outline the history of expert evidence, from
early developments, to the general acceptance of Frye, and finally, to the
incomplete revolution of Daubert. Part IV will summarize current Frye
standards in use. Part V will make a case for the relative merits of Frye in
the criminal context, and propose a common Frye standard designed to limit
the admission of unverified expert testimony. Part VI will apply that
standard to the five stages of expert testimony outlined in Professor
Imwinkelried’s paper.42
In cases that rest on subsequently invalidated expert testimony, it is
imperative to offer post-conviction relief in a manner that balances finality
and accuracy—interests which, all too often, come into conflict.43 The
ultimate goal for all participants in the criminal justice system, however,
should be to create a world in which as few people as possible need to seek
post-trial right relief—a world in which expert evidence is rigorously and
effectively tested ex ante by trial courts. Post-conviction avenues for
exonerations are necessary, but they are only curative on a case-by-case
basis; reforming the admission of expert evidence at trial represents a
universal solution. Both are necessary.
II. CURRENT ISSUES SURROUNDING THE ADMISSION OF FORENSIC
EVIDENCE
Nearly ten years ago, the NRC laid bare the structural weaknesses of
forensic science, ranging from non-standardized training regimens, to a
dearth of resources, to wholly unsubstantiated practice areas.44 These
revelations were not intended to disparage a deeply necessary intersection of
science and the law. Rather, keeping in mind Brandeis’ maxim that sunshine
is the best disinfectant,45 these findings were released to spur further
improvements to assist law enforcement in identifying the perpetrators of
crime and to reduce the frequency of wrongful convictions.46 The fact
42
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Debunked, Discredited, but Still Defended Revising State
Post-Conviction Relief Statutes to Cover Convictions Resting on Subsequently Invalidated
Expert Testimony, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1095 (2018).
43
See Vincent P. Iannece, Breaking Bad Science: Due Process as a Vehicle for
Postconviction Relief When Convictions Are Based on Unreliable Scientific Evidence, 89 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 195, 227 (2015) (contrasting the institutional need for finality with the broader
societal goal of fairness and accuracy).
44
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 96; see also Cino, supra note 9, at 652
(“[A] lack of research led to testimony—and closing arguments—that exceed[] the boundaries
of science.”).
45
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914)
(“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”).
46
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 4–5. The NRC also included
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remains, however, that nine years ago, a non-partisan, congressionally
appointed committee found the state of forensic science to be lacking.47
Forensic science is grounded in the notion that a piece of evidence has
unique characteristics that can relate it back to another object or a specific
user.48 In some forms of pattern identification, however, techniques have
been found to lack scientific backing.49 Arson evidence and forensic
odontology are examples of disciplines whose credibility in the courtroom is
thought to rest largely on faith.50
Although a scientific foundation exists to support the analysis of
explosions (i.e., reconstructing the materials from which a bomb was built),
the variability of burn patterns has not been studied to a degree that would
allow forensic scientists to reliably determine whether a particular fire was
the work of nature or arson.51 In spite of a “paucity of research,” evidentiary
techniques amounting to little more than “rules of thumb” have been
permitted in front of jurors.52 Such evidence was critical in securing a guilty
verdict for Han Tak Lee.53 Mr. Lee was ultimately exonerated after serving
twenty-four years in prison, partially because his conviction rested on a
faulty scientific inference from testimony regarding “charring patterns and
glass fracturing indicat[ing] a deliberately set fire.”54 Similarly, many of the
commonplace forensic techniques used to indicate the presence of an
accelerant have not held up under scientific scrutiny.55
Forensic odontology, the application of dentistry to criminal
investigations, may be the most controversial area of forensic science.56 Bite
marks are often created during the course of particularly violent crimes,

homeland security as one of the key policy imperatives underpinning a needed improvement
in forensic science. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 4–5.
47
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 5 (“[M]ajor challenges still face
the forensic science community.”).
48
Cino, supra note 9, at 654 (finding “uniqueness” to be the key notion upon which
forensic science is grounded).
49
Id.
50
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 170–76 (highlighting the
weaknesses of the aforementioned disciplines).
51
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 172–73.
52
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 173.
53
Kirk Semple, Locked Away for 24 Years, an Exonerated Man Still Feels Imprisoned,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/11/nyregion/locked-awayfor-24-years-han-tak-lee-still-feels-imprisoned.html.
54
Id.
55
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 173 (“[M]any of the rules of thumb
that are typically assumed to indicate that an accelerant was used (e.g., ‘allegatoring’ of wood,
specific char patterns) have been shown not to be true.”).
56
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 173 (calling bite mark comparison
the most controversial of the areas surveyed by the NRC).
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including homicides, sexual assaults, and cases of child abuse.57 These
marks can reliably be used to exclude suspects.58 Forensic odontology,
however, cannot positively identify a suspect in an accurate manner, because
“[u]nfortunately, bite marks on the skin will change over time and can be
distorted by the elasticity of the skin, the unevenness of the surface bite, and
swelling and healing.”59
The gap between science and legal substantiation does not exist in a
vacuum; it exists in the courtroom. Unfortunately, once an expert is able to
present scientifically unsound evidence to the jury, it is often too late for the
defendant to recover, even if that evidence is “palpably wrong.”60 As a
discipline, forensic science took the 2009 NRC Report incredibly seriously,
and has responded earnestly.61 Legislatures, too, are beginning to respond
in kind.62 The courts, however, have lagged behind.63
Part of the problem is that, broadly speaking, “judges and lawyers []
lack the scientific expertise necessary to comprehend and evaluate forensic
evidence in an informed manner.”64 Moreover, beyond the lack of
specialized scientific knowledge in the legal community, it is the intellectual
gap that exists between how jurists and scientists pursue the truth that often
leads to incongruous results.65 Whereas the law embraces the adversarial
system to pursue a final and just resolution of disputes66—a particularly
fraught process for criminal defendants attempting to introduce expert
testimony67—science is allowed the time to determine the truth
57

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 173.
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 176.
59
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 174.
60
See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“[S]cientific proof
may in some instances assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of
layman.”); see also Black et al., supra note 12, at 789 (“Though there is some disagreement,
most commentators believe ostensibly scientific testimony may sway a jury even when as
science it is palpably wrong.”).
61
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 1–2 (detailing the
recommendations derived from the National Commission on Forensic Science’s four-year
congressional mandate, as well as recommendations for the future).
62
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473.7 (West 2017); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
11.073 (West 2015).
63
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 110 (labeling the adversarial
process as unsuited “to the task of finding ‘scientific truth’”).
64
Id. at 110.
65
Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1484
(1995) (“[D]ifferences between law and science have engendered both systemic and
pragmatic dilemmas for the law and the actors within it.”).
66
See id. (finding the purpose of the adversarial process, and its version of “truth,” to
contrast with the goals of science).
67
Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78 MINN.
L. REV. 1345, 1359 (1994) (“Studies show that courts have been quite reluctant to authorize
funds for defense experts.”); see also Paul C. Giannelli, “Junk Science”: The Criminal Cases,
58
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empirically.68
According to the NRC report “[m]uch forensic evidence . . . is
introduced in criminal trials without “meaningful scientific validation,
determination of error rates, or reliability testing to explain the limits of the
discipline,” forcing the system to instead rely upon the adversarial process
(or lack thereof) to separate the wheat from the chaff.69 In an extreme
example of this process falling short, ballistics evidence was admitted even
when the testifying sergeant “conceded, over and over again, that he relied
mainly on his subjective judgment.”70 Although the judge opined that the
sergeant’s testimony “ought not be considered admissible under Daubert,”71
she admitted the evidence under pressure from the decisions of her peers, as
similar ballistics evidence had been admitted by “every single court postDaubert . . . .”72 Remarkably, using bitemark evidence for the purposes of
positive identification remains good law, even in the wake of the 2009 NRC
report.73 Given the reality of what criminal defendants face when confronted
with the state’s forensic experts—namely, an unequal battle for the minds of
jurors74—it is time to revisit the standards by which those experts are
introduced, in order to improve the test necessary for delimiting science from
pseudoscience.75
84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105, 124–25 (1993) [hereinafter Junk Science] (detailing cases
in Oklahoma and Alabama where “the defense did not retain experts, because the presiding
judge had refused to authorize funds”).
68
Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, supra note 65, at 1484.
69
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 107–08 (finding fraught areas of
forensic science—namely bite mark, firearm, and tool mark identification, to regularly be
introduced without any meaningful examination of their scientific underpinnings).
70
United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D. Mass. 2005).
71
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 108.
72
Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 108 (italicized emphasis omitted). The judge continued by
stating: “I reluctantly come to [this] conclusion because of my confidence that any other
decision will be rejected by appellate courts, in light of precedents across the country,
regardless of the findings I have made. While I recognize that the Daubert-Kumho standard
does not require the illusory perfection of a television show . . . the standards should be higher
than were met in this case, and than have been imposed across the country. The more courts
admit this type of toolmark evidence without requiring documentation, proficiency testing, or
evidence of reliability, the more sloppy practices will endure; we should require more.” Id.
at 109.
73
See Milone v. Camp, 22 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding the inclusion of forensic
odontology in a murder trial insufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial); see also Burke
v. Town of Walpole, 405 F.3d 66, 82–83 (1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting petitioners claim that being
jailed for forty-one days on the basis of bite mark evidence, even in the presence of
exculpatory DNA evidence, represented “reckless disregard for the truth”).
74
Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and Criminal Prosecutions, 26 CRIM. JUST. 61, 62 (2011)
[hereinafter Daubert and Criminal Prosecutions]; see also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supra note 3, at 98 (“[P]rosecutors usually have an advantage over most defendants in offering
expert testimony in criminal cases.”).
75
See Berger, supra note 67, at 1359 (noting the difficulties defendants face in procuring
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXPERT EVIDENCE: EARLY COMMON LAW TO
DAUBERT
A. Early Developments
Throughout the history of the Anglo-American justice system, experts
have had a hand in settling disputes.76 Over time, common law courts
employed two methods for drawing upon the knowledge of experts, one of
which forms the basis for expert testimony as we know it today.77 The first
method, in place for hundreds of years, employed expert jurors when issues
extended outside the ken of the layman.78 Pulled from a pool of skilled
tradesmen, a special jury would be tasked with a case that directly related to
their craft.79 The second method, “call[ing] to the aid of the court skilled
persons whose opinion it might adopt or not as it pleased,”80 was a far more
permissive process than that seen in today’s courtrooms.81 If an individual
was proffered as an expert in a given area, he would be admitted and allowed
to testify.82 Although overbroad, this standard nonetheless represents the
lineage from which today’s system of expert testimony derives; experts were
qualified according to their area of specialization, they outlined a particular
scientific method (the major premise), then applied that method to the
particular fact pattern before them (the minor premise).83 The devil,
however, is indeed in the details when it comes to the admission of expert
testimony. Laissez-faire was not to last.84

expert testimony).
76
See Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert
Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1901) (describing developments in Anglo-American
expert testimony, from 1345 until 1901).
77
See id. (stating that “there seem to have been two modes of using what expert
knowledge there was”—namely, impaneling a special jury and offering expert testimony to
lay jurors).
78
See id. at 41 (outlining the history and procedures involved in impaneling a special
jury).
79
See id. (listing, for example, the leader of a guild as a potential expert juror).
80
Id. at 40.
81
Owen, supra note 2, at 354 (“The courts generally allowed . . . experts to provide
relevant testimony about technical matters as a matter of course: once a person was qualified
as an expert, the judge simply admitted into evidence his or her relevant opinion testimony.”).
82
See id. (“At early common law, the only real limit[] on expert testimony was that the
person proffered as an expert be qualified as an expert in the field.”).
83
Hand, supra note 76, at 52. (“Having no experience . . . [the jury] should take those
generalizations into the stock of the major premises which they apply to the facts, and using
them, say whether A wrote the note or did not.”).
84
See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013–14 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (representing the
first major test constricting the free flow of expert testimony in court).
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B. The Formulation of Frye
As the sciences began to exert greater and greater influence in the early
twentieth century, the legal system struggled to create a coherent test to
govern the admissibility of evidence outside the ken of the layman.85 Frye
v. United States86 represented the first major development in reforming the
admission of expert evidence.87 Although Frye was barely a two-page
opinion with its jurisdictional influence limited to Washington D.C.,88 it
grew to become the predominant test governing the admission of expert
evidence in the United States.89 This unlikely landmark case, citing no
authority, and offering no explanation, reshaped the landscape of admissible
expert evidence around “general acceptance.”90 Frye’s underlying facts
were simple. The defendant appealed from a conviction of second degree
murder, alleging a single assignment of error—the denial of a defense expert
offered to testify to the result of a “deception test.”91 In essence, the test was
an early version of a lie detector that relied on measuring systolic blood
pressure in order to discern true answers from false ones.92
On appeal, the court affirmed the exclusion of the expert’s testimony
on the grounds that use of this proto-lie detector had not been accepted by
physiological or psychological authorities.93 Laying the groundwork for
decades of evidentiary decisions to come, Frye laid out an “evolutionary”
process by which a technique was to be vetted by the relevant scientific
community.94 The key language states:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
85

Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, supra note 65, at 1486.
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
87
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 88 (calling Frye the “first notable
development” in the development of tests governing the admissibility of scientific evidence).
88
Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
89
See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1205 (1980) [hereinafter Admissibility
of Novel Scientific Evidence] (declaring that the Frye test “dominated the admissibility of
scientific evidence for more than half a century”).
90
Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
91
Id. at 1014.
92
Id. at 1013 (“Scientific experiments, it is claimed, have demonstrated that fear, rage,
and pain always produce a rise of systolic blood pressure, and that conscious deception or
falsehood, concealment of facts, or guilt of crime, accompanied by fear of detection . . . raises
the systolic blood pressure . . . .”).
93
Id. at 1014.
94
See Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 89, at 1204 (stating that the
evolutionary process by which expert evidence is vetted through the scientific community
hinges on an “experimental” stage whereby it undergoes scrutiny).
86
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principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.95
This passage ushered in a two-step analysis.96 First, a judge must decide
under which scientific field a technique falls.97 Second, that judge must
determine whether the members of that field have generally accepted that
technique.98 For seventy years following its formulation, Frye’s “‘general
acceptance’ test [was] the dominant standard for determining the admission
of novel scientific evidence at trial.”99
On its own, however, Frye did not delineate either the boundaries or
the justifications for centering its test around the general acceptance of the
scientific community.100 The test was promulgated ipse dixit; courts across
the country, however, have provided post-hoc rationalizations, offering a
pluralistic, regional approach to the idea of general acceptance.101 The
common crystallization of the policy underpinning Frye could best be
summarized as “a standard which in effect permits the experts who know
most about a procedure to experiment and to study it,”102 thus assuring that
“those persons most qualified to assess the validity of a scientific technique
[] have the determinative voice.”103 In this way, the Frye test was viewed as
an attempt to limit the risk of exposing jurors—broadly thought to be
overawed in the presence of an expert—to flawed scientific testimony104 by
first screening the testimony through a test of an “essentially conservative
nature.”105
95

Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
See Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 89, at 1208.
97
See Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 89, at 1208.
98
See Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 89, at 1208.
99
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993).
100
See Imwinkelried, supra note 1 (“In Frye itself the court did not articulate any policy
justification for the general acceptance standard; the court merely mandated the standard as
ipse dixit.”).
101
See id. (“Later courts developed the policy rationale that was conspicuously missing
in the original Frye opinion.”).
102
People v. Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 171, 194 (Mich. 1977). The court would go on to
ground the Frye test in the tradition of the expert jury described by Learned Hand, supra notes
60–62, describing the general consensus test as, “[i]n effect, [] a kind of technical jury, which
must first pass on the scientific status of a procedure before the lay jury utilizes it in making
its findings of fact.” Id.
103
People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 325 (Cal. 1994).
104
See Imwinkelried, supra note 1 (describing the historical fear held by the court that a
risk will “overawe lay jurors”).
105
Leahy, 882 P.2d at 325.
96
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Within these broad confines, there existed, and exists, a great deal of
variation and consternation about how to quantify when a technique has
achieved general acceptance, and who constitutes the relevant scientific
community.106 There are, however, some common patterns that can be
delineated. First, the test is limited to novel scientific theories.107 This
creates, in effect, an inevitable twilight period between the time when a
scientific principle is discovered, and when that principle is sufficiently
validated by peer review.108 Secondly, in many jurisdictions, the Frye test is
not triggered by “soft” sciences such as psychiatry, psychology, or the social
sciences.109 Across jurisdictions, however, the Frye test was understood to
be a deliberate obstacle, interposed between uncertain scientific principles
and the jury.110
Although it would assume a position of massive import, Frye almost
became an afterthought.111 After twenty-five years, the case had only been
cited in two federal cases112 and nine state cases.113 By the time the Federal
Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1975, fifty-two years later, general
acceptance itself was broadly accepted across jurisdictions, though it was
106

See generally Cino, supra note 9, at 660 (calling Frye “one of the most vague and
ambiguous decisions in American jurisprudence”); see also Comparative Bullet Lead
Analysis, supra note 36, at 58 (“If the Frye standard is to have any teeth at all, the only sensible
way to apply it is to expand the inquiry to canvass the sentiment in any group of experts whose
education and training equip them to assess the validity of the theory”).
107
See Imwinkelried, supra note 1 (stating that the courts “have limited the reach of the
test in three respects” including liming the test to novel theories, excluding soft sciences, and
exempting non-scientific expertise); cf. Ramirez v. State, 810 So.2d 836, 848–50 (Fla. 2001)
(modifying the novelty requirement starkly in the process of excluding an established forensic
technique—knife mark analysis—from the jury). Notably, the court finds the testimony of
the state’s forensic experts as to the technique’s general acceptance to be facially insufficient
on its own. Id.
108
See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. 1923).
109
See, e.g., People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984), overruled by People v.
Mendoza, 4 P.3d 265 (Cal. 2000) (rejecting the application of the California variant of Frye
by distinguishing between expert testimony and scientific evidence).
110
See People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Cal. 1976) (“Frye was deliberately intended
to interpose a substantial obstacle to the unrestrained admission of evidence based upon new
scientific principles.”).
111
See Cino, supra note 9, at 660.
112
See Refoule v. Ellis, 74 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Ga. 1947) (rejecting the use of a polygraph
by citing its disapproval in Frye); Medley v. United States, 155 F.2d 857 (D.C. 1946) (finding
that spectroscopy had sufficient acceptance within the scientific community).
113
State v. Bohner, 246 N.W. 314 (Wis. 1933); Beuschel v. Manowitz, 271 N.Y.S. 277
(Sup. Ct. 1934); People v. Kenny, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Co. Ct. 1938); People v. Forte, 4 N.Y.S.2d
913 (Co. Ct. 1938); Bednarik v. Bednarik, 16 A.2d 80 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1940); State
v. Cole, 188 S.W.2d 43 (Mo. 1945); State v. Lowry, 185 P.2d 147 (Kan. 1947); Boeche v.
State, 37 N.W.2d 593 (Neb. 1949); People v. Morse, 38 N.W.2d 322 (Mich. 1949). In seven
out of the nine cases, the holding of Frye was interpreted extremely narrowly, and only
applied to either similar versions of the systolic blood pressure device, or subsequent lie
detectors. Id.
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infrequently litigated.114 Yet, although Frye was widely accepted in the
criminal world,115 it was not cited federally in a civil case until 1984.116
Ultimately, following years of mounting frustration with the general
acceptance standard in both arenas, it was ultimately a civil case that wrote
Frye out of the law books in a majority of jurisdictions.117
C. An Incomplete Revolution
Daubert was a revolution a long time in the making.118 Based in part
on the vagueness of the Frye test, courts found it difficult to determine the
appropriate body to evaluate whether an idea was generally accepted, and to
determine the degree to which a scientific technique needed to be accepted
in order to constitute general acceptance.119 Beyond the difficulties
associated with the ambiguities of Frye, there was concern that the test was
“unduly conservative,” serving to obscure the “principles of relevance and
probity.”120 There was also a push by scholars for a test which served the
goal of Frye, filtering out unsound science without serving as an obstacle to
cutting-edge techniques.121
The adoption of FRE 702 in 1975 was intended to respond to these
concerns, and to guide the introduction of expert evidence for federal courts
in both civil and criminal litigation.122 Despite its admirable goal, however,
Rule 702 only served to further divide jurisdictions.123 On its face, the
114
See Cino, supra note 9, at 660 (showing that, though Frye had been accepted by almost
every U.S. jurisdiction by the time the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted, it was
infrequently litigated).
115
Thomas Lyons, Frye, Daubert and Where Do We Go From Here?, R.I. B.J., Jan. 1997,
at 5 (“Virtually every federal and state court addressing the general acceptance standard
adopted it.”).
116
Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 739 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1984)
(representing the first federal civil opinion to invoke Frye).
117
See Cino, supra note 9, at 661 (listing Frye’s shortcomings as a series of unanswered
questions, including “[w]ho determines the relevant scientific community,” “[h]ow does the
court define the relevant scientific community,” and “[h]ow mainstream should a theory or
technique be before it becomes relevant”).
118
See Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 89, at 1207–08 (writing
fourteen years before the passage of Daubert that “the problems Frye has engendered—the
difficulties in applying the test and the anomalous results it creates—so far outweigh these
advantages that the argument for adopting a different test has become overwhelming”).
119
Cino, supra note 9, at 661.
120
Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, supra note 65, at 1486.
121
See Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 89, at 1224; see also Cino,
supra note 9, at 661 (“The argument against using the Frye rule is that it may frustrate or
foreclose the use of innovative techniques.”).
122
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 586–87 (1993) (casting the
merits of Frye in a dubious light and asserting that the Frye test “was superseded by the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence”).
123
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 89 (showing how Rule 702’s
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original version of Rule 702 stood in opposition to the conservative Frye test,
mandating that specialized knowledge be heard by the trier of fact, so long
as: (1) the expert was qualified; and (2) that the evidence served to help the
fact finder understand a relevant issue in the case.124 Assistance to the jury
was thus substituted for acceptance by the scientific community.125 In the
wake of the adoption of Rule 702, there was much consternation over
whether Frye had been subsumed by the Federal Rules.126 And although
Frye had largely been confined to criminal trials, by the last quarter of the
twentieth century it was complaints of “junk science” in tort claims that
ignited the most visible debates.127 From this point on, criminal trials were
to take a backseat to tort claims in the debate over expert evidence.128
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a civil case, finally
resolved the question of Rule 702’s supremacy.129 Merrell Dow, the makers
of Bendectin, had moved for summary judgment, supported by an affidavit
from a qualified expert who stated that there had been no study
demonstrating a link between Bendectin and deformations in embryonic
development.130 The plaintiffs attempted to counter with experts of their
own.131 The district court, however, excluded the plaintiffs’ experts on the
grounds that their testimony relied on animal studies, unsubstantiated
pharmacological studies, and re-analyses of previously unpublished
epidemiological data—,information that the district court found to have
insufficient acceptance among the relevant scientific community.132 The
appellate court, citing Frye, affirmed.133
The U.S. Supreme Court not only found that Frye had been superseded
by the Federal Rules of Evidence, but also that a “rigid standard” was “at
odds with [the] Rules’ liberal thrust, and their general approach of relaxing
the traditional barriers to ‘opinion’ testimony.”134 The Daubert Court found
that Rule 702’s gatekeeping function was more properly the responsibility
apparent substitution of the requirement of general acceptance with “mere ‘assistance’ to the
trier of fact” caused a great deal of controversy among the courts).
124
FED. R. EVID. 702.
125
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 89.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
See Junk Science, supra note 67, at 110–11 (contrasting the vigor with which “civil
litigation with high financial stakes” is litigated, with the relative absence of attention received
in criminal cases by stating “[t]he neglect of the problems of expert testimony in criminal
prosecutions is deplorable, if not inexplicable”).
129
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm,, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 575 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
133
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129–30 (9th Cir. 1991).
134
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
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of the judge, who would then be tasked with assessing the “scientific validity
of a particular technique or methodology on which an opinion is
premised.”135 Drawing from Rule 702’s language concerning scientific
knowledge, the Court formed a five part test for assessing the validity of a
theory or technique, consisting of asking: (1) whether a theory has been
tested; (2) whether that theory has been subjected to peer review; (3) whether
a known rate of error has been demonstrated; (4) whether there were
standards governing the technique; and lastly, (5) whether the theory met the
traditional Frye general acceptance standard.136 Thus, the Daubert Court
subsumed the scientific community’s consensus within a broader, juristcentered approach to expert evidence, open to the admission of cutting-edge
techniques.137 The Court emphasized that the standard was a flexible one,
focusing on principles and methodology, not conclusions.138 To combat the
introduction of faulty evidence, the Court leaned on the advantages of the
adversarial system’s “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof [as] the traditional
and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”139
Daubert’s impact was dramatic, spurring an additional amendment of
the Federal Rules,140 and two subsequent cases that came to be seen as
comprising the Daubert trilogy.141 As the evolving standard has established
itself, it is evident that questions concerning the admissibility of expert
evidence are generally raised pretrial142 and are largely immunized against
reversal.143 Moreover, “whether Daubert’s specific factors are, or are not,
reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case[, it] is a matter with
which the law grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine.”144

135

Id. at 594.
Id. at 592–94.
137
See id. at 594–95 (stating that the “overarching subject is the scientific validity and
thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the principles that underlie a proposed
submission”).
138
Id.
139
Id. at 596.
140
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
141
See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (holding that the “abuse of
discretion” standard applies to the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence); Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (finding that Daubert’s gatekeeping role applies to
all expert testimony, not just scientific testimony).
142
See Alfred v. Caterpillar, Inc., 262 F.3d 1083, 1087 (10th Cir. 2001) (“district courts
[can] reject as untimely Daubert motions raised late in the trial process”).
143
See Gen. Elec. Co., 522 U.S. at 142–43 (quoting Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645,
658 (1879) (“Cases arise where it is very much a matter of discretion with the court whether
to receive or exclude the evidence; but the appellate court will not reverse in such a case,
unless the ruling is manifestly erroneous.”).
144
Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S at 138.
136
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D. Daubert and the Admission of Faulty Forensic Science
Just as the goals of science and law are different, the aims and means
of civil and criminal law are different, precluding the use of a uniform
solution for expert testimony. Replacing Frye with Daubert produced “a
profound improvement” in the civil justice system,145 resulting in rising
standards of dependability, and an environment open to cutting-edge
science.146 These benefits, however, have not been similarly reflected in the
criminal system.147 In the seven years following Daubert, there were sixtyseven federal appellate cases involving challenges to the government’s
evidence in criminal cases.148 Of those sixty-seven cases, sixty-one were
won by the prosecution.149 Of those six won by the defense, just one resulted
in the reversal of a conviction.150 This indicates a low likelihood of
overturning evidentiary rulings in criminal cases on Daubert grounds.151
The question, then, is why the difference in results between civil and
criminal cases? The answers are largely straightforward. The first reason is
money. In civil cases, which frequently involve experts when litigating toxic
tort suits, the contingency fee structure means that even a financially-limited
party can still afford to hire an expert.152 Criminal defendants, on the other
hand, often cannot afford experts. And the criminal justice system generally
does not afford them the means to procure experts.153 This frequently puts
145

STEIN, supra note 7, at 237.
See D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of
Certainty Being left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 149 (2000) (crediting the Daubert
trilogy with the heightening of standards in civil cases).
147
See STEIN, supra note 7, at 237 (“[T]he replacement of Frye by the Daubert Trilogy
introduced a profound improvement into the civil, as opposed to the criminal justice systems
across the United States.”); see also Daubert and Criminal Prosecutions, supra note 74
(“There is little question that Daubert has had a substantial impact on civil litigation”).
148
Risinger, supra note 146, at 104.
149
Risinger, supra note 146, at 104.
150
Risinger, supra note 146, at 104.
151
Risinger, supra note 146, at 104.
152
See Neufeld, supra note 33, at S109–10. “The reality is that if a corporation is sued
for millions of dollars in a toxic tort case, plaintiffs’ attorneys hire scientific experts because
they stand to share in any settlements or award. The substantial legal fees paid by the
corporation enable civil defendants to secure the services of equally well-regarded experts.
Judges consider the science with far greater scrutiny and caution.” Neufeld, supra note 33, at
S109–10.
153
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 11 (highlighting, among the
differences between criminal and civil cases, the fact that civil defendants have equal access
to experts as plaintiffs, whereas “prosecutors usually have an advantage over most defendants
in offering expert testimony in criminal cases”). This is not to say that indigent defendants
require further public funds for procuring experts to vindicate their rights. Frye is markedly
less reliant on the adversarial process, as the decision-making body—the scientific
community—is not party to litigation. See, e.g., People v. Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 171, 194
(Mich. 1977) (describing the general consensus test as, “[i]n effect, [] a kind of technical jury,
146
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criminal defendants on an unequal playing field in offering expert
testimony.154 The second reason is incentive. In a civil case, either party has
the right and incentive to appeal a non-frivolous loss, whereas criminal cases
offer more restricted appellate access and a lower chance of success.155 The
third reason is experiential. A criminal defendant’s challenge will often fail
because courts “routinely affirm admissibility citing earlier decisions rather
than facts established at a hearing.”156 In addition, defense lawyers
frequently lack the scientific background or funds to proceed with a Daubert
challenge to forensic science.157 It appears that appellate courts are more
willing “to second-guess trial court judgments on the admissibility of
purported scientific evidence in civil cases than in criminal cases.”158 A
broad survey of cases found the thoroughness with which criminal cases
were evaluated to be sorely lacking.159
Has, then, Daubert’s liberal criteria for admitting expert testimony
proven incompatible with the realities of the criminal justice system? The
legacy of Daubert would suggest it either opened the door too wide, or relied
on “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
careful instruction,” which are factors better suited to civil trials.160 Moving
the gatekeeping role from the laboratory to the courtroom may have proven
too great a burden for the criminal justice system.161 In their concurrence to
the Daubert opinion, Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens, as odd a pair of
bedfellows as there ever was, cautioned against issues related to relocating
the gatekeeper function.162 While FRE 402 provides guidance governing the
which must first pass on the scientific status of a procedure before the lay jury utilizes it in
making its finding of fact”).
154
Daubert and Criminal Prosecutions, supra note 74, at 62; see also NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 98 (“Prosecutors usually have an advantage over most
defendants in offering expert testimony in criminal cases.”).
155
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 98.
156
Neufeld, supra note 33, at S109–10.
157
Neufeld, supra note 33, at S109–10.
158
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 11.
159
Risinger, supra note 146, at 100. “The system shipwreck I fear is that . . . we will find
that civil cases are subject to strict standards of expertise quality control, while criminal cases
are not. The result would be that the pocketbooks of civil defendants would be protected from
plaintiffs’ claims by exclusion of undependable expert testimony, but that criminal defendants
would not be protected from conviction based on similarly undependable expert testimony.
Such a result would seem particularly unacceptable given the law’s claim that inaccurate
criminal convictions are substantially worse than inaccurate civil judgments, reflected in the
different applicable standards of proof.” Risinger, supra note 146, at 100.
160
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
161
See Neufeld, supra note 33, at S109–10 (“If no one challenges the speculative science
or scientists, there is nothing for a gatekeeper to tend to.”).
162
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596–97 (Rehnquist, C.J., & Stevens, J., concurring) (agreeing
with the majority that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded Frye, but presciently
expressing a belief in the court system’s capacity to handle matters of statute and case law, as
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relevance of admissible evidence, there is no such guidance for jurists to
assess scientific “reliability.”163 Of this added responsibility, Justice
Rehnquist stated that he did “not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge
some gatekeeping responsibility . . . but I do not think it imposes on them
either the obligation or authority to become amateur scientists in order to
perform that role.164
IV.

CURRENT FRYE STANDARDS

As it exists in criminal cases, Daubert represents a two-part problem.
First, the standard is too permissive.165 Second, there are structural issues
inherent in the criminal system, not present in the civil system, which
dampen the effectiveness of Daubert’s intended safeguards against unsound
science.166 Therefore, it is worthwhile to re-examine the standard the
Daubert court deemed too austere.167
The Frye test offers a chance to obviate the two key issues posed by
Daubert as a result of its inherently conservative nature, potentially offering
criminal defendants a better chance of having scientifically unsound
evidence excluded before trial.168 It is appropriate, therefore, to review the
state of Frye as currently implemented in state courts, with an eye toward
assessing the factors critical to aiding the twin goals of forensic science
specifically, and justice generally; namely, the goals of convicting the guilty
and exonerating the innocent. To do so, this paper reviews the existing Frye
jurisdictions’ definition of “general acceptance,” the sources the courts look
to for validation, and the criteria under which the courts assess “general
acceptance,” as well as each jurisdiction’s policy justifications for doing so.
A. California: People v. Leahy
California, our nation’s most populous state, remains a Frye
jurisdiction.169 People v. Leahy,170 a post-Daubert challenge, involved a
criminal defendant who appealed the admission of a horizontal gaze
opposed to defining “scientific knowledge”).
163
Id.
164
Id. at 600.
165
See infra Part II.D for a discussion of the issues surrounding the admission of expert
evidence in criminal trials under Daubert.
166
Id.
167
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
168
See STEIN, supra note 7, at 196–97 (expressing skepticism at the ability of Daubert to
offer individualized testing to criminal defendants, and support for excluding evidence based
on the Frye standard in the criminal setting).
169
People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994) (confirming the vitality of Frye in
California).
170
Id.
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nystagmus (HGN) field sobriety test171 used as evidence against him in a
DUI trial.172 The trial court found that Kelly173-Frye, the California variant
of the Frye test, was inapplicable, on the basis that the HGN field sobriety
test was not in fact a true test, but merely a description of symptoms.174 The
California Supreme Court both overturned the trial court’s decision and
required the application of Kelly-Frye, while also reasserting the validity of
the Kelly-Frye analysis in the wake of Daubert.175
As defined by the court, “general acceptance” does not require a
unanimous opinion, or even majority support by the scientific community.176
It is instead a decision of whether “the technique is deemed unreliable by
‘scientists significant in number or expertise.’”177 Those tasked with making
the determination as to the reliability of an evolving technique are the
members of the scientific community developing a given method.178 KellyFrye defines general acceptance along the lines of the traditional, Frye, twostep process, requiring: (1) that reliability be established by expert testimony;
and (2) that such testimony be given by a properly qualified expert.179
California, however, added the requirement that “the proponent of the
evidence must demonstrate that correct scientific procedures were used in
the particular case.”180 Moreover, California affords limited de novo appeal
rights to those challenging Kelly-Frye decisions. Boundaries of review are
generally limited to the evidence available on the record. In special
circumstances, exceptions allow the appellate court to view scientific
evidence outside the record.181
From a policy standpoint, the Leahy court’s justifications for
maintaining the Frye standard were identified as:
(1) assuring that those persons most qualified to assess the
validity of a scientific technique would have the determinative
voice, (2) providing a ‘minimal reserve of experts’ to critically
examine each technique in a particular case, (3) promoting
uniformity of decision based on finding a consensus in the
171

Id. at 323 (“Nystagmus is an involuntary rapid movement of the eyeball, which may
be horizontal, vertical, or rotary. An inability of the eyes to maintain visual fixation as they
are turned from side to side . . . is known as horizontal gaze nystagmus.”).
172
Id. at 323.
173
People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).
174
Leahy, 882 P.2d at 324.
175
Id. at 325.
176
Id. at 329.
177
Id. at 336 (quoting People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1377 (Cal. 1982)).
178
Id. at 325.
179
Id.
180
Leahy, 882 P.2d at 325.
181
Id. at 330 (citing People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 736 (Ct. App. 1992)).
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scientific community, and (4) protecting the parties by its
‘essentially conservative nature.’182
These four points, in combination with the relative austerity of Kelly-Frye,
are credited by the Leahy court as serving to prevent unreliable techniques
from being used to determine the guilt or innocence of criminal defendants
by precluding “the vagaries of pseudoscience.”183
B. Washington, D.C.—Roberts v. United States
Washington, D.C. remains a Frye jurisdiction, as confirmed in 2000.184
In Roberts v. United States,185 a defendant challenged the trial court’s
decision to admit DNA evidence on the grounds that the F.B.I.’s statistical
formula failed to incorporate the rate of false positives.186 In evaluating that
evidence, the D.C. Court of Appeals defined general acceptance along strict
Frye lines.187 The Roberts court determined that it was permitted to consider
“not only expert evidence of record, but also judicial opinions in other
jurisdictions, as well as pertinent legal and scientific commentaries.”188 The
court’s criteria for assessing general acceptance were quite simple,
formulated as “consensus versus controversy . . . not its validity.”189 In D.C.
courts, Frye decisions are reviewed de novo.190 Before Roberts, the court
had outlined its justifications for maintaining Frye as a safeguard against
exposing the jury to the particular weight exercised by expert testimony.191
In the view of the Roberts court, in order to be admissible, “the totality of
expert testimony must be sufficiently extensive and coherent so that one can
reasonably say that an expert . . . testified that the elements at issue . . . have
been established under sound scientific principles.”192 Ultimately, the

182

Id.
Id. at 331.
184
See Bahura v. S.E.W. Inv’rs, 754 A.2d 928, 943 n.15 (D.C. 2000) (“[A] division of
this court lacks the authority to supplant Frye with Daubert and Kumho Tire Co.”); see also
M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312–13 (D.C. 1971) (detailing how the District of Columbia
Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 stripped the United States Court of
Appeals of the power to review judgments of the D.C. Court of Appeals).
185
916 A.2d 922 (D.C. 2007).
186
Id. at 929.
187
Id. (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (1923)).
188
Id. (citing United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 635 (D.C. 1992)).
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Bahura v. S.E.W. Inv’rs, 754 A.2d 928, 947 (D.C. 2000) (Stedman, J., concurring)
(“While ordinarily it is within the province of a jury to pick and choose among the evidence
that it hears on the basis of its common sense and experience, I think that given the nature of
expert testimony, the same freedom cannot be uncritically admitted.”).
192
Id. at 948.
183
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Roberts court rejected the defendant’s appeal, concluding that the Frye
standards do not require testimony regarding laboratory error rates.193
C. Florida—Ramierez v. State
Although at one point the state legislature attempted to mandate use of
the Daubert standard in both civil and criminal trials, the Florida Supreme
Court overruled the legislature and reasserted the vitality of the Frye test.194
Florida’s variant of the Frye test may serve as the best model for excluding
forensic evidence that lacks scientific backing.195 Its version of the test offers
a “reinvigorated Frye test” that incorporates elements of Daubert,196 creating
a “Frye-plus-reliability” standard.197 Under this variant, the court uses a
more malleable definition of the traditional novelty requirement,198 which
makes a greater number of cases eligible for an evidentiary challenge, while
also enveloping expert evidence within a reliability standard.199
In this 2001 appeal, the defendant, Ramirez, challenged his murder
conviction, which, in part, rested on the testimony of a Miami crime
technician who concluded that the defendant’s knife “was the murder
weapon to the exclusion of all others.”200 Although it took three appeals and
the influence of Daubert,201 the Florida Supreme court ultimately excluded
the State’s tool mark evidence on the grounds that it lacked an adequate
scientific basis to be presented to the jury.202
The Ramirez court defined general acceptance as requiring more than a
mere “nose count” of experts in the field; rather it is the court’s role to accord
weight to relevant sources, including “expert testimony, scientific and legal
193

Roberts v. United States, 916 A.2d 922, 931 (D.C. 2007).
In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 210 So.3d 1231, 1240 (Fla. 2017).
195
Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert Revisited, 41 CRIM. LAW. BULL. (2005) [hereinafter
Daubert Revisited].
196
Id.
197
See Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 326 (Ill. 2002) (naming
the revised Frye test).
198
See Ramirez v. State, 810 So.2d 836, 852 (Fla. 2001) (particularizing Frye’s novelty
requirement such that it applies to a specific forensic expert’s version of knife mark
identification procedure). Toolmark identification generally, and knife-mark identification
particularly, were well-established branches of forensic science in 2001, when this appeal was
decided, and in 1983, when the murder in question was committed. See id. at 845
(“Traditional ‘knife mark’ evidence is a subgroup of the broad category of evidence referred
to as ‘tool mark’ evidence. The theory underlying tool mark evidence . . . has long been
upheld by courts.”).
199
See id. at 842 (expanding novelty by finding the particular application of a traditional
technique to be novel enough to trigger the need for Frye).
200
Id. at 839.
201
See Daubert Revisited, supra note 195 (explaining the impact of Daubert on Frye, with
particular reference to Ramirez).
202
Ramirez, 810 So.2d at 849–54.
194
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publications, and judicial opinions,” and render a decision based on the facts
of the case and the scientific methodology at hand.203 General acceptance
requires impartial and independent proof.204 “A bald assertion by the expert
that his deduction is premised upon well-recognized scientific principles is
inadequate to establish its admissibility if the witness’s application of these
principles is untested . . . .” 205
In its decision, the Ramirez court established a four-part relevance test
for establishing acceptance, which incorporated an understanding of
scientific accuracy drawn from Daubert.206 First, the court should look to
determine whether the methodology has been formally tested.207 Second, the
court should evaluate whether the technique has been subjected to
meaningful peer review.208 Third, the proponent of the evidence must prove
the general acceptance of “both the underlying scientific principle” and “the
testing procedures used to apply the principle to the facts of the case at
hand.”209 Lastly, the court must consider whether a given technique has a
quantified error rate, and if so, what that error rate is.210 As in Washington,
D.C., all Frye decisions in Florida are subject to de novo review.211 These
criteria are grounded in the “underlying theory . . . that . . . [i]f the scientific
community considers a procedure or process unreliable for its own purposes,
then the procedure must be considered less reliable for courtroom use.”212
In the process of affirming de novo as the appropriate standard of
review for Frye, Florida chose to highlight the applicability of both legal
reliability and scientific reliability.213 The existence of, and contrast
between, the two standards, gives appellants an avenue by which to
challenge the scientific evidence underpinning a conviction, irrespective of
whether or not that evidence was deemed novel.214 Traditional applications
of established scientific techniques must pass through the classic Rule 403
test, which should inherently exclude evidence that is “unduly prejudicial,

203

Id. at 844.
Id. at 851 (“In applying the Frye criteria, general scientific recognition requires the
testimony of impartial experts or scientists. It is this independent and impartial proof of
general scientific acceptability that provides the necessary Frye foundation.”).
205
Id. at 844.
206
Daubert Revisited, supra note 195.
207
Ramirez, 810 So.2d at 849.
208
Id. at 849–50.
209
Id. at 851.
210
Id.
211
Id. at 844.
212
Id. at 843 (quoting Stokes v. State, 584 So.2d 188, 193–94 (Fla. 1989)).
213
See Ramirez, 810 So.2d at 842–46 (describing both the standards of review and
appropriate applications of scientific and legal reliability).
214
Id.
204

EPPSTODOROW (DO NOT DELETE)

1184

8/8/2018 2:03 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1161

misleading, or confusing”—in other words, patently untrue evidence.215
Challenges under the traditional 403 test are reviewed on appeal under an
abuse of discretion standard.216 Rule 403 analysis is “inapposite” in the
presence of novel scientific methods or novel applications of existing
scientific methods, as the “court may be unable to gauge accurately” the
degree to which the jury may be misled.217 Therefore, challenges to Frye
hearings are reviewed de novo, which has the beneficial effect of
encouraging lower courts to rigorously apply the general acceptance test, lest
they be reversed.218 In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court found that
the state’s proffered evidence failed the Frye test, and went so far as to call
it a classic example of junk science.219 In this de novo review, assessing a
novel application of a traditional scientific technique, the court reinforced
the need to stringently apply Frye by stating:
[i]n sum, [the state expert’s] knife mark identification
procedure—at this point in time—cannot be said to carry the
imprimatur of science. The procedure is a classic example of the
kind of novel ‘scientific’ evidence that Frye was intended to
banish—i.e., a subjective, untested, unverifiable identification
procedure that purports to be infallible. The potential for error or
fabrication in this procedure is inestimable. In order to preserve
the integrity of the criminal justice system in Florida, particularly
in the face of rising nationwide criticism of forensic evidence in
general, our state courts—both trial and appellate—must apply the
Frye test in a prudent manner to cull scientific fiction and junk
science from fact.220
D. Illinois—In re Commitment of Simons
As stated in Illinois Rule of Evidence 702,221 and as confirmed by In re
Commitment of Simons,222 Illinois is without a doubt a Frye jurisdiction.
Unlike Florida, Illinois hearkens to an earlier version of Frye, rejecting the
incorporation of Daubert-era innovations by stating that “Frye does not
make the trial judge a ‘gatekeeper of’ all expert testimony.”223 Moreover,
the Supreme Court of Illinois also explicitly rejected the burgeoning test it

215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223

Id. at 843.
Id. at 842–43.
Id.
Id. at 844–45.
Ramirez, 810 So.2d at 853.
Id.
ILL. R. EVID. 702.
821 N.E.2d 1184 (Ill. 2004).
Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 324–326 (Ill. 2002).
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termed “Frye-plus-reliability.”224
In Illinois, the general acceptance test only applies to a scientific
methodology that is “original or striking” or if that method “does not
resemble something formerly known or used.”225 A theory will be deemed
generally accepted if it is reasonably relied upon by experts in the field at
issue.226 Once a principal has gained general acceptance it is almost
impossible to dislodge it from the legal system, as its “general acceptance is
presumed in subsequent litigation.”227 This viewpoint stems from the idea
that the trial judge’s role is limited merely to ruling on the acceptance of a
technique, and does not encompass shielding the fact finder from potentially
baseless or later discredited scientific techniques.228 Any generally accepted
technique will be presented to the fact finder, who then accords that expert
what weight they will.229
E. Maryland—Wilson v. State
Like Illinois, Maryland is also a Frye state by statute. Unlike Illinois,
however, the Maryland Supreme Court found merit in the so-called Fryeplus-reliability standard, stating that, “[t]estimony concerning an unreliable
scientific process . . . or unreliable opinion is of little value to a jury.”230 In
2002, this principle was formalized in Wilson v. State,231 a case which
reviewed the trial court’s decision to admit expert testimony that relied on
the product rule—a statistical rule governing the probability of independent
events—to prove that the appellant’s children almost certainly could not
have both died of SIDS, thus implicating the appellant as a murderer.232
In Maryland, general acceptance is defined as an absence of genuine
controversy within the relevant scientific community.233 To determine
whether or not the deaths of the petitioner’s children were conclusively
independent, something the prosecution’s expert sought to disprove, the
court consulted medical journals concerning pediatrics and genetics.234
224
225

Id. at 326.
In re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d at 1189 (quoting Donaldson, 764 N.E.2d at

325).
226

Id.
Donaldson, 767 N.E.2d at 325.
228
In re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d at 1188–89 (limiting the judge’s role to
consideration of general acceptance of novel scientific techniques).
229
Donaldson, 767 N.E.2d at 326 (“Questions concerning underlying data, and an
expert’s application of generally accepted techniques, go to the weight of the evidence, rather
than its admissibility.”).
230
Wilson v. State, 803 A.2d 1034, 1039 (Md. 2002).
231
Id. at 1039–47.
232
Id. at 1039–40.
233
Id. at 1045.
234
Id. at 1044.
227
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Although the State cited articles suggesting there was no link between genes
and SIDS, the broader scientific consensus, as observed in a majority of
articles, took the position that it is “unknown whether there is a genetic
component to SIDS.”235 Thus, because of the lively debate within the
scientific community concerning the independence, or lack thereof, of SIDS
deaths within a single family, the evidence was excluded under Frye.236
Importantly, from Maryland’s initial acceptance of the general
acceptance test in 1978, their courts mandated that the reliability of a novel
scientific technique be a precondition for the admission of expert testimony,
even before considering whether or not that technique had garnered general
acceptance.237 As such, the state adopted a somewhat unique approach to
incorporating the notion of novelty. Established, non-novel techniques with
broad and general acceptance within the scientific community, such as
ballistics tests and blood tests, can be judicially noticed without a Frye
hearing.238 Importantly, the inverse applies to techniques based on unsound
science; “a court may take judicial notice that certain procedures, widely
recognized as bogus or experimental, are unreliable.”239 When judicial
notice is inappropriate, and a Frye hearing is necessary, the proponent of the
evidence must demonstrate the reliability of the technique, and the court
should also take notice of reliable scientific journals that evaluate the
acceptance of a particular process.240 This affords a procedural avenue by
which proven techniques can move through efficiently, and whereby
dubiously valid techniques—even established ones—can appropriately be
screened and eliminated from evidence where appropriate.
F. New Jersey—State v. Doriguzzi
With facts similar to People v. Leahy in California, State v. Doriguzzi241
affirmed New Jersey’s continued use of Frye—albeit in a more limited
capacity—in a case evaluating the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test.242
235

Id.
Wilson, 803 A.2d at 1044–45.
237
Id. at 1039 (citing Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364 (Md. 1978)).
238
Id. at 1039–40.
239
Id.
240
Id. The court clarified its procedure in the following manner: “When the reliability of
a particular technique is not subject to judicial notice, however, ‘it is necessary that the
reliability be demonstrated before testimony based on the technique can be introduced into
evidence. Although this demonstration will normally include testimony by witnesses, a court
can and should also take notice of law journal articles, articles from reliable sources that
appear in scientific journals, and other publications which bear on the degree of acceptance
by recognized experts that a particular process has achieved.’” Id. (quoting Reed, 391 A.2d
at 368).
241
760 A.2d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
242
Id. at 337.
236
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Unique among the several states, New Jersey offers an example of a
jurisdiction that divides its evidentiary test along criminal/civil lines.243 The
state applies Daubert in toxic tort cases, while remaining a Frye jurisdiction
in all other matters.244 The key issue in Doriguzzi was whether evidence
gleaned from the HGN test was properly admitted at trial without any
foundational testimony from an expert to establish general acceptance within
the scientific community.245 Trial courts in New Jersey are not permitted to
introduce evidence from novel techniques without evidence of expert
acceptance, unless there exists a previously published New Jersey Supreme
or Superior Court opinion that verifies that technique.246 In this instance, the
prosecution argued that the HGN test was not scientific at all, but was simply
an observation of the officer, thereby making it more properly characterized
as lay testimony.247
In New Jersey at the time, a proponent of a new scientific technique
could demonstrate general acceptance in three ways: (1) by expert testimony
from those in the relevant profession; (2) by “authoritative scientific and
legal writings”; or (3) by judicial opinions.248 The Doriguzzi court surveyed
court opinions from outside jurisdictions, as well as scientific and legal
articles.249 The vast majority of states have found the HGN test to be
scientific.250 The Doriguzzi court acknowledged that “[r]eliance on other
courts’ opinions can be problematic ‘[u]nless the question of general
acceptance has been thoroughly and thoughtfully litigated in [] previous
cases.’”251 This latter consideration led the Doiguzzi court to give credence
to a Illinois Supreme Court opinion that had disallowed use of the
technique.252 Illinois had rejected HGN testing on the grounds that the
relevant scientific community sharply diverged as to “the correlation
between the BAC level and the angle of onset at which nystagmus occurs.”253
Because New Jersey adheres to the notion that jurists are not scientists, it
leaned on this science-backed legal opinion in deciding not to admit evidence
of HGN testing.254

243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254

State v. Harvey, 668 A.2d 596 (N.J. 1997).
Id.
Doriguzzi, 760 A.2d at 337.
Id.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 341–42.
Id. at 342–43.
Id. at 342.
Doriguzzi, 760 A.2d at 346 (quoting People v. Kirk, 681 N.E.2d 1037 (Ill. 1997)).
Id. at 337.
Id. at 341–46 (quoting State v. Witte, 836 P.2d 110, 1119–21 (Kan. 1992)).
Id. at 342.
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G. New York—State v. LeGrand
New York offers a version of the Frye standard that directly prevents
the court from considering the reliability of a technique.255 In 2007, the
Court of Appeals of New York opined on whether it was proper to admit
expert testimony concerning the reliability of eyewitness testimony.256 In its
opinion, the LeGrand court stated that the Frye test asks whether a technique
generates “results accepted as reliable within the scientific community.”257
In doing so, the emphasis lies on the importance of “‘counting scientists’
votes, rather than . . . verifying the soundness of a scientific conclusion.”258
Once a technique is validated by Frye, further hearings need not be
conducted.259 Largely on these grounds, the court concluded that expert
testimony concerning eyewitness identification was admissible in that
instance,260 and that it was an “abuse of a court’s discretion to exclude expert
testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications.”261
Although LeGrand is a rare instance of a defendant prevailing in an
evidentiary challenge, it is worth noting that the case involved evidence that
the defendant was seeking to enter—not a challenge to the scientific
underpinnings of the prosecution’s evidence.262 Under the formula outlined
by the LeGrand court, New York’s version of the Frye test does not take the
scientific reliability of a technique into consideration.263 Instead, it adheres
to a version of the Frye test explicitly rejected in other jurisdictions264—a
simple poll.265 As there is minimal inquiry beyond a headcount, it offers
defendants few chances to the scientific validity of a forensic technique.266

255
See People v. LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d 374, 379 (N.Y. 2007) (finding that establishing
scientific reliability under the Frye test is based on a poll of scientists within the relevant
community).
256
Id. at 376.
257
Id. at 379 (quoting Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp., 857 N.E.2d 1114, 1120 (N.Y. 2006)).
258
Id. (quoting People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 464 (N.Y. 1994)).
259
Id. at 380 (quoting Wesley, 633 N.E.2d at 462).
260
See id. (finding that “a number of New York courts” admitted eyewitness
identification through the Frye test).
261
LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d at 379.
262
Id. at 375.
263
Id. at 379 (quoting Wesley, 633 N.E.2d at 464).
264
See, e.g., supra Part III.C, discussing Ramirez v. State, specifically the text at footnote
202, where the Florida Supreme Court defined general acceptance as more than a “nose count”
of experts, designating the court’s role as rendering a decision based on all relevant sources,
the facts of the case, and the scientific methodology at hand. Id.
265
LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d at 354.
266
Id.
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H. Pennsylvania—Commonwealth v. Dengler
Like Illinois, Pennsylvania is a Frye state by statute.267 Also, like
Illinois, and New York as well, it offers a test of limited utility.268 Confirmed
as a Frye state in Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc,269 Pennsylvania’s test is triggered
by novel science, or scientific techniques used in a novel way.270 Novelty is
determined on an individualized basis; science initially deemed novel can be
affected by a developing consensus or the strength of a later proponent’s
offer.271 Items that are the subject of statutory provisions, such as the
psychiatric criteria by which a sexual offender is deemed a sexually violent
predator, are ineligible for consideration under Frye.272 Once novelty is
established, the test then requires the proponent to show that the
methodology used is generally accepted within the relevant scientific
community, but not that the scientific community has generally accepted an
expert’s conclusions.273 On appeal, Frye rulings are judged by an abuse of
discretion review.274 The Frye test in Pennsylvania remains one designed to
protect the jury from the “mystic infallibility” of scientific evidence,275 and
employs a strict definition of novelty.276
I.

Washington—State v. Greene

In admitting expert evidence, the state of Washington employs a twopart inquiry.277 First, testimony must pass its version of the Frye test.278
Second, the testimony must be admissible under state rule of evidence 702
(ER 702).279 In State v. Greene,280 the Supreme Court of Washington
evaluated whether evidence of dissociative identity disorder was admissible

267

PA. R. EVID. 702(c).
See supra Parts III.D and III.G.
269
839 A.2d 1038 (Pa. 2003).
270
Commonwealth v. Dengler, 890 A.2d 372, 382 (Pa. 2005).
271
Id.
272
Id. at 382–83.
273
Id. at 386 (citing Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1045 (Pa. 2003)).
274
Id. at 378.
275
Id. at 381 (quoting Commonwealth v. Topa, 369 A.2d 1277, 1282 (Pa. 1977)).
276
See Dengler, 890 A.2d at 382 (limiting Frye to novel evidence and emphasizing the
court’s ability to rely on previous decisions in lieu of further Frye hearings on a given subject).
277
State v. Greene, 984 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Wash. 1999).
278
See id. Under Washington State’s version of the Frye test, novel evidence is
admissible if “(1) the scientific theory or principal upon which the evidence is based has
gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community of which it is a part; and (2)
there are generally accepted methods of applying that theory or principle in a manner capable
of producing reliable results.” Id.
279
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 702 (West 2017).
280
984 P.2d 1024 (Wash. 1999).
268
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to establish a defense of either insanity or diminished capacity.281 In order
to evaluate the admissibility of the defense’s proffered evidence, the court
analyzed “the level of recognition accorded to the scientific principle
involved.”282 That level of recognition hinged on whether there was
“significant dispute between qualified experts” or not.283 Specifically, the
court looked to general acceptance within the scientific community, “without
reference to its forensic application in any particular case.”284
In spite of the fact that the court determined that there existed a
moderate, ongoing dispute as to the strength of dissociative identity disorder,
the Greene court found that testimony regarding the condition met the Frye
standard.285 To meet ER 702, however, a scientific principle must not only
be generally accepted, but it must also be capable of forensic application to
the facts of a particular case.286 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of
Washington excluded the testimony on the grounds that it could not be
applied to the facts, as such testimony could not help the fact finder
determine whether the defendant was mentally culpable.287 This adds
another mechanism for evaluating the validity of established expertise which
may be flawed as offered in the particular case in a different fashion than
takes place in Florida or Maryland.288
V. EVOLVING FRYE
A. The Merits of Frye in Criminal Prosecution
In an ideal world, Daubert would be a perfectly adequate test for
assessing the validity of expert evidence in the criminal justice system. Were
defendants able to afford to wage a bona fide battle of the experts,289 were
the system unburdened of costs, time, and a full caseload, then perhaps each
case could live up to the Daubert court’s expectations.290 In reality, however,
281

Id. at 1025.
Id. at 1027.
283
Id. (emphasis added).
284
Id.
285
Id.
286
Greene, 984 P.2d. at 1029.
287
See id. at 1032 (holding that dissociative identity disorder is generally accepted in the
psychiatric and psychological communities).
288
Compare Greene, 984 P.2d at 1024–32 (using a statutory mechanism to tie Frye to a
relevance standard), with Ramirez v. State, 810 So.2d 836 (Fla. 2001), and Wilson v. State,
803 A.2d 1034, 1039 (Md. 2002) (modifying the common law in order to add a relevance
requirement to Frye).
289
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 11 (outlining the limitations which
bear upon criminal defendants).
290
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (detailing the
Court’s hopes for the adversarial process with respect to expert evidence).
282
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we need to account for the system of criminal justice that we have. It is one
where inescapable and practical constraints mean that in most trials it is only
the prosecution that presents expert evidence.291 It is one where “most
commentators believe ostensibly scientific testimony may sway a jury even
when, as science, it is palpably wrong.”292 In far too many instances, the
realities of criminal prosecution have forced an unequal application of
Daubert whereby
civil cases are subject to strict standards of expertise quality
control, while criminal cases are not. The result [is] that the
pocketbooks of civil defendants [are] protected from plaintiffs’
claims by exclusion of undependable expert testimony, but that
criminal defendants [are not] protected from conviction based on
similarly undependable expert testimony.293
How, then, can we serve the twin goals of criminal justice—
apprehending the guilty and exonerating the innocent?294 Although the
potential of Frye’s test seems never to have been fully realized,295 Frye, at
its core, possessed the requisite muster.296 This may explain why, in the
wake of Daubert, some jurisdictions revitalized their respective Frye tests.297
At the center of Frye lies an “essentially conservative nature”298 that affords
scientists a leading role in determining which techniques are sound enough
to be presented to lay jurors.299 This directly dovetails with the driving
purpose behind this conference. In essence, Frye hews towards the
antiquated but desirable goal of appointing a jury of experts, in the end
allowing those qualified to offer a preliminary assessment.300

291
Berger, supra note 67, at 1359 (“Studies show that courts have been quite reluctant to
authorize funds for defense experts.”).
292
Black et al., supra note 12, at 789.
293
Risinger, supra note 146, at 99.
294
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 96.
295
See Daubert Revisited, supra note 195 (explicating the underlying issues with Frye,
but offering up a Florida Supreme Court case as “a reinvigorated Frye test”).
296
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. 1923) (“The thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.”).
297
See id.
298
People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 325 (Cal. 1994).
299
See People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Cal. 1976) (“Frye was deliberately intended
to interpose a substantial obstacle to the unrestrained admission of evidence based upon new
scientific principles.”).
300
See People v. Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 171, 194 (Mich. 1977) (describing Frye as an
extension of the tradition of the expert jury).
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Filtering expert testimony through Frye in trial level rulings—rulings
which are subject to a highly deferential standard of appellate review—
redirects the foundation of evidentiary decisions away from judges and
lawyers who “generally lack the scientific expertise necessary to
comprehend and evaluate forensic evidence in an informed manner.”301 It
stands to reason that criminal justice’s drastically higher burden of proof—
where the penalty is freedom as opposed to pecuniary loss—deserves a more
stringent standard that will better shield determinations of guilt from the
“vagaries of pseudoscience.”302
B. Building a Better Frye Test
The ultimate goal of Frye was to ensure that expert evidence is based
on “sound scientific principles.”303 Sadly, it has frequently failed to live up
to that goal.304 Its flaws lie in either excluding good science, or allowing past
admission of bad science to serve as grounds for future admission.305 Up to
this point, however, these issues stem not from the spirit of Frye, but rather
from its implementation. The vagueness of key elements of the case have
“allowed judges to pay lip service to Frye, yet base admissibility decisions
on their own substantive scientific judgments and/or personal biases.”306
The core of Frye, on its face, is in line with the goals of excluding junk
science and banning flawed methods. What is needed to bridge the gap
between theory and practice, then, is renewed focus on Frye’s key terms,
allowing Frye to live up to its original promise. To do so, one must take a
hard look at current Frye standards, and identify the factors that advance
these goals and those that hinder them. As described above, some state
standards have been strengthened—by adding Daubert’s reliability elements
into the general acceptance test.307 It is this “Frye-plus-reliability”308 model
which offers the best hope to “preserve the integrity of the criminal justice

301

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 110.
Leahy, 882 P.2d at 332.
303
Bahura v. S.E.W. Inv’rs, 745 A.2d 928, 948 (D.C. 2000).
304
See Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 89, at 1207–08 (writing
fourteen years before the passage of Daubert that “the problems Frye has engendered—the
difficulties in applying the test and the anomalous results it creates—so far outweigh these
advantages that the argument for adopting a different test has become overwhelming”).
305
See Cino, supra note 9, at 660 (listing Frye’s shortcomings as a series of unanswered
questions, including “[w]ho determines the relevant scientific community,” “[h]ow does the
court define the relevant scientific community,” and “[h]ow mainstreatmainstream should a
theory or technique be before it becomes relevant”).
306
See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 154.
307
See Daubert Revisited, supra note 195 (saying that Ramirez v. State, 810 So.2d 836
(Fla. 2001) “represents a reinvigorated Frye test, and it is not alone”).
308
Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 326 (Ill. 2002).
302
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system” by distinguishing “science fiction and junk science from fact.”309
To achieve this goal, this article proposes a five-pronged approach: first,
expand the definition of novelty; second, clarify the meaning of general
acceptance; third, determine the makeup of the relevant scientific
community, and the role that group plays in conjunction with the trial judge;
fourth, clarify the test for determining reliability; and fifth, build in pressure
valves for correcting errors.
Novelty is the characteristic that triggers the Frye test.310 Too often,
however, courts rest their decisions on the fact that the proffered scientific
method had previously been admitted into evidence, even in the face of
evidence that the proffered technique had lost the general acceptance of the
scientific community.311 Therefore, the definition of novelty needs to be
broadened to apply Frye analysis to a larger category of expert analysis. The
novelty requirement should not only be triggered by the novelty of a whole
field of science, but it also should be particularized to the way in which a
forensic scientist is applying that field in a given case.312 Florida provides
an admirable example.313 In Ramierez v. State, the Florida Supreme Court
applied the Frye test to a case involving tool mark evidence, even though
tool mark evidence had been used in court for decades prior to the Ramirez
case.314 What the court was reviewing, and what triggered the Frye test, was
the particular expert’s application of the expertise to the facts in the case at
hand.315 The court excluded his examination, which claimed to be able to
identify the defendant’s knife with perfect accuracy, as a new application of
a very old scientific principle.316 Broadening the mandatory application of
the Frye test in this fashion will require courts to re-examine old techniques
when applied to novel fact patterns, thus ensuring that more cases are
exposed to the rigor of evaluating the underlying veracity of scientific
principles in the concrete setting of the case, rather than as an abstract
concept.

309

Id. at 853.
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. 1923).
311
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 107 (“[C]ourts often ‘affirm
admissibility citing earlier decisions rather than facts established at a hearing’”) (quoting
Neufeld, supra note 33, at S109)).
312
Ramirez v. State, 810 So.2d 836 (Fla. 2001).
313
Id.
314
See id. at 842 (expanding novelty by finding the particular application of a traditional
technique to be novel enough to trigger the need for Frye).
315
See id. (particularizing Frye’s novelty requirement such that it applies to a specific
forensic expert’s version of knife mark identification procedure).
316
Id.
310

EPPSTODOROW (DO NOT DELETE)

1194

8/8/2018 2:03 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1161

Second, after the trigger for Frye analysis is better defined, Frye’s
parameters require further clarification. The definition of “general
acceptance” has frustrated judges and academics alike for decades.317
Fortunately, one of the great gifts of common law jurisprudence is the ability
to redefine key terms after the fact.318 In this instance, several state courts
have offered a lesson in how to (and how not to) define general acceptance.
As Frye seeks to account for the power of experts over fact finders,319 and to
ensure protection from spurious science,320 general acceptance cannot
merely be limited to a headcount. It should be properly defined as an absence
of genuine controversy within the relevant scientific community at the time
of the court’s analysis.321
Third, it is important to properly identify both the makeup of the
relevant scientific community, and to clarify the role(s) that group should
play in the trial judge’s analysis. In order to determine whether controversy
exists with regard to the particular scientific principle, it is helpful to think
of support for a given theory as akin to sufficiency, whereas the quality of
that support is analogous to weight. To meet Frye’s requirement of general
acceptance, a theory should have both broad support, as well as the support
of the key leaders in that field.322 In answering this question, the judge serves
as the bridge between the scientific and legal worlds. It is her or his role to
ensure that the proponent’s claim rests on more than a bald assertion of
acceptability.323 Rather, the judge must make a determination of whether the
scientific principle enjoys general acceptance by weighing all relevant
scientific sources, including “expert testimony, scientific and legal
publications, and judicial opinions.”324

317
See Cino, supra note 9, at 660 (stating the lack of a workable definition as a key flaw
in Frye).
318
See Imwinkelried, supra note 1 (“Later courts developed the policy rationale that was
conspicuously missing in the original Frye opinion.”). Edward J. Imwinkelried, The
Importance of Daubert in Frye Jurisdictions, 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 215 (2006).
319
See Imwinkelried, supra note 1 (describing the historical fear held by the court that a
risk will “overawe lay jurors”).
320
People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 332 (Cal. 1994) (seeking to protect jurors from “the
vagaries of pseudoscience” via Frye).
321
See e.g., Wilson v. State, 803 A.2d 1034, 1045 (Md. 2002) (defining general
acceptance as an absence of genuine controversy within the relevant scientific community).
322
See id. at 844. See id. at 1039–40.
323
Ramirez v. State, 810 So.2d 836, 844 (Fla. 2001) (“A bald assertion by the expert that
his deduction is premised upon well-recognized scientific principles is inadequate to establish
its admissibility if the witness’s application of these principles is untested[.]”).
324
Id. at 844.
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Fourth, the judge must ensure that the sources being used to evaluate
acceptance are indeed reliable. Drawing on the “Frye-plus-reliability” tests
featured in Florida325 and Maryland,326 which fold Daubert-esque factors
into general acceptance, judges should consider a three-step process for
evaluating reliability. First, judges should look to the methodology used in
the given field, and whether standards have been established. Second, tests
used to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt should
themselves be subject to statistical scrutiny in the form of both meaningful
peer review, and the establishment of a quantifiable error rate. Lastly, the
proponent of a theory should be obligated to prove general acceptance of
both the underlying scientific principle and the acceptance of the procedure
used to apply that principle to the facts at hand in a case. Applying these
three factors will exclude “[t]estimony concerning an unreliable scientific
process,” as an “unreliable opinion is of little value to a jury.”327
Fifth, Frye requires mechanisms on both the trial and appellate levels
designed to excise extreme examples of flawed science from the system.
Maryland offers a prime example for course correcting at the trial level in
circumstances involving non-novel procedures.328 Currently, non-novel
techniques with broad acceptance, including ballistics tests and blood tests,
can be excused from Frye analysis through judicial notice. In Maryland, the
inverse is also true; when patently unsound science comes before the bench,
“a court may take judicial notice that certain procedures, widely recognized
as bogus or experimental, are unreliable.”329 If Maryland’s procedure were
to be applied in conjunction with Federal Rule of Evidence 201’s
requirement that a noticed fact “be accurately and readily determined from
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,”330 the trial
judge’s inquiry would expand to include a contemporary understanding of
any given scientific technique. Judicial notice affords a procedural avenue
by which proven techniques can move through efficiently, and whereby
suspect techniques—even established ones—can be screened out of the trial
process.
At the appellate level, removing unsound science would be facilitated
by emphasizing the opportunities for relief that apply to techniques that meet
the expanded definition of novelty, as well as established scientific

325

Id.
Wilson, 803 A.2d at 1039.
327
Id.
328
See id. (allowing judges to take judicial notice that techniques are empirically
unreliable).
329
Id. at 1039–40.
330
FED. R. EVID. 201.
326
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techniques. Florida331 and California332 review their Frye decisions de novo.
As no judge wants to be reversed, de novo review will encourage trial judges
to be especially conscientious in adjudicating Frye issues. For addressing
non-novel evidence, the Ramirez court made it clear that there are two
avenues for relief: one under which evidence that meets its expanded
definition of novelty can be challenged de novo; and another under which
traditional applications of traditional techniques can be challenged, albeit by
an abuse of discretion standard.333 Though the likelihood of success is
drastically lower under an abuse of discretion standard, emphasizing both
avenues highlights a commitment to excising convictions that rest on faulty
science.
VI. FRYE, REVISED AND APPLIED
In Professor Imwinkelried’s 2017 article,334 he outlined five stages at
which prejudicial errors can be introduced into the trial process via flawed
expert testimony: (1) the witness’s status as an expert; (2) the general
technique or theory on which the witness relies, otherwise known as the
major premise; (3) the witness’s case-specific facts, or the minor premise;
(4) the application of the major premise to the minor premise; and (5) the
final conclusion. His statutory, post-conviction remedy, offers a clear step
forward in terms of remedying past mistakes that balances the need for
finality against the demands of accuracy.335 Trial courts, however, remain
the best cost avoiders, with the greatest ability to mitigate the risk of
convictions that rest on faulty evidence, thereby helping to obviate the need
for post-conviction litigation.
This paper’s proposed Frye-plus-reliability standard most clearly helps
to mitigate the introduction of error at stages two and four of Professor
Imwinkelried’s outline of the trial process. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to propose tighter standards upon experts (step one), or their
conclusions (step five), as those concerns can only be addressed by the
forensic community itself. Moreover, case specific facts (step three) must
be accepted as given. By addressing error at steps two and four, the expert’s
technique and the application of that technique to the facts of a case, the
updated Frye model encourages a more thorough screening of forensic
analysis.

331
332
333
334
335

Ramirez v. State, 810 So.2d 836 (Fla. 2001).
People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994).
Ramirez, 810 So.2d. at 843.
Imwinkelried, supra note 42.
Imwinkelried, supra note 42.
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On its face, Frye has always been designed to address the second step
governing the admission of expert evidence: the technique which an expert
will apply to the facts of a case. The trigger for the test, however, has
traditionally been limited to novel techniques. Expanding the trigger for the
test—a broadening of the novelty requirement—will expose a greater
number of techniques and theories to the scrutiny of the scientific
community. Moreover, the proposed expansion of judicial notice would
afford a second layer of protection against the presentation of flawed
scientific evidence. Judges would be allowed to exclude egregious examples
of faulty techniques, even non-novel ones, thus preserving the scientific
integrity of the trial through the second stage.
The proposed model offers a chance to stretch Frye to cover the
introduction of error at stage four by expanding the novelty requirement to
include the major premise’s application to the minor premise. Florida’s
example, where a forensic scientist was applying tool mark evidence, offers
a case-in-point example for excluding subsequently invalidated evidence
through Frye. The Florida Supreme Court’s justification for excluding that
technique stemmed from the idea that the application of the technique itself
was novel. Expanding novelty in this fashion provides a new layer for
effectively monitoring expert testimony in criminal cases.
Frye can never be stretched to incorporate Professor Imwinkelried’s
final stage where error can be introduced—the ultimate conclusions of
experts. The court cannot regulate what forensic experts decide. The
knowledge and training of these experts positions them as key to interpreting
forensic evidence. By interposing the scientific community between
individual experts and the ears of jurors, however, the conclusions of those
experts will not need to be regulated. The Frye-plus-reliability test is
designed to screen out error, whether because of the expert’s reliance on
unsound techniques, or unsound application of existing techniques to
particular facts, at the earliest possible stage.
VIII. CONCLUSION
There were excellent reasons for trying to improve upon the Frye
standard. Conventional wisdom is not the arbiter of ultimate truth,
particularly scientific truth. Just tell Galileo that the sun revolves around the
earth, or Marie Curie that there are no new elements to be discovered, or
Elon Musk that electric cars are insipid. Daubert and Rule 702 enormously
improved the world of civil litigation, affording attorneys on both sides the
opportunity to offer cutting edge science in pursuit of civil justice. Criminal
law, however, is simply a different world. On a practical level, it is not
feasible to expect criminal defendants—the majority of whom are
represented by defenders’ associations—to wage a battle of the experts
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against the state. Simply put, Frye is a standard of exclusion and Daubert is
a standard of inclusion. When it is liberty that is at risk, scientific consensus
and certainty are the pillars upon which reasonable doubt should rest. This
is why a return to the Frye test, updated for the Daubert age, offers the best
chance to improve the quality of expert evidence underpinning criminal
convictions.

